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NOTES
TITLE VII AND STATE COURTS: DIVINING
IMPLICIT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WITH
REGARD TO STATE COURT JURISDICTION
Title. VII,' enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 5 To initiate
Title VII proceedings, an employee files a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 4 If the EEOC dismisses the charge for
lack of reasonable cause° or has not acted on the complaint within a specified period,
the EEOC must notify the employee, who then has the right to file a civil action against
the employer.°
The text of Title VII provides that federal district courts have jurisdiction of civil
actions brought to enforce its provisions.' While the statute expressly authorizes trials in
Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VII, §§ 701-718, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)).
2 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
3 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
§ 703(b),(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b),(c) extends similar prohibitions to employment agencies and
labor organizations.
§ 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Title VII also authorizes EEOC commissioners to file charges
on behalf of employees. Id.
Id.
§ 706(f' )(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
7 706(1)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) provides:
Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
(Title VII]. Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which
the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial
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federal district court, the jurisdictional language does not indicate whether state courts
have concurrent authority to hear Title VII actions. Because neither Congress, in sub-
sequent amendments," nor the Supreme Count' has addressed the jurisdictional ambi-
guity, lower federal courts and state courts have drawn their own conflicting conclusions
as to the jurisdiction of state courts under Title VII."'
Underlying the diverse decisions regarding state court jurisdiction is a longstanding
principle which provides that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of
federal law claims where Congress neither expressly nor implicitly prohibits state court
jurisdiction." Looking to Title VII nonjurisdictional provisions and legislative history,
as well as Supreme Court decisions, some courts have concluded that state courts may
exercise jurisdiction under Title VII." The findings of concurrent jurisdiction rest on
the lack of evidence, in either Title VII itself or its legislative history, that Congress
expressly or implicitly prohibited state courts from hearing Title VII claims." Other
courts, however, have interpreted the same sources differently, concluding that only
federal courts have Title VII jurisdiction." In support of their findings of exclusive
federal court jurisdiction, the courts have cited Congress's affirmative references to
federal courts alone, in both the text and legislative history of Title VII, as evidence of
Congress's implicit intent to authorize federal court jurisdiction to the exclusion of state
courts." Of the two contrasting analyses of the Title VII jurisdictional provision, only
one can fairly reflect congressional intent regarding the role of state courts.
Regardless of how they decide the Title VII jurisdiction issue, courts must look to
the legislative history for evidence of congressional intent. In scrutinizing the legislative
history of Title VII, however, courts have tended to focus on what Congress said or
omitted to say regarding the states and state courts, without giving comparable consid-
eration to the events that led to the drafting of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 6 It is the
historical context, rather than specific language in the statute or congressional debates
and reports, which best illuminates Congress's intent with regard to state courts under
Title VII."
district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and
administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have
worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the [employer] is not
found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial
district in which the [employer] has his principal office ....
" The Title VII jurisdiction provision remains substantially unchanged. Compare the original
version, § 706(f), 78 Stat. 260-61 (1964) with the current provision, supra note 7.
'See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 (1982), discussed infra notes
87-88 and accompanying text.
"c" See infra notes 95-149 and accompanying text.
" Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
12 See, e.g., Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 (D.N.J. 1976). For a
discussion of cases where courts have found concurrent state court jurisdiction, see infra notes 122-
49 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Bennun, 413 F. Supp. at 1279-80.
14 See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of
cases where courts have found exclusive federal court jurisdiction, see infra notes 97-123 and
accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 436.
16 See infra notes 52-80, 95-147.
See infra notes 52-80.
March 1987]	 TITLE VII	 301
As the balance of this note will discuss, resolution of the dispute regarding state
court authority tinder Title VII is contingent on what role Congress intended for state
courts. Identifying congressional intent, in turn, depends on evidence in Title VII itself
and its legislative history. Part I will review the statutory provisions, legislative history,
and Supreme Court precedents on which lower federal courts and state courts have
relied in deciding the issue of state court jurisdiction under Title V II.t 6 The courts'
failure to address Congress's motivation in enacting Title VII and the Civil Rights Act
generally will be evident in Part II, which summarizes select decisions on the Title VII
jurisdiction issue. 16 Discussion first will focus on cases where courts have concluded that
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction and then will turn to cases where courts have
concluded that state courts share jurisdiction with federal courts. Part III will analyze
the text and legislative history of Title VII for evidence of congressional intent and
conclude that under Title VII as it now stands, federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 20
Finally, Part IV will propose that Congress amend Title VII to provide expressly
for the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts, at least in states that have and are enforcing
adequate state fair employment laws." Although exclusive federal court jurisdiction
might have been essential when Congress first proposed Title VII, the states have since
become more able and willing to remedy the effects of discrimination. The change in
circumstances since Congress enacted Title VII indicates not only that exclusive juris-
diction is unnecessary but that concurrent state court jurisdiction is desirable.
I. STATUTORY TEXT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
With the enactment of Title VII, which was an exercise of Congress's constitutional
authority to regulate interstate commerce,22 Congress established a wide-ranging federal
prohibition against private employment discrimination. 25 To implement the new federal
policy, Congress created the EEOC, whose primary responsibility was to investigate
employee complaints," and authorized the federal district courts to grant relief where
the complaints were meritorious. 25 Nonetheless, although it was the inadequacy of state
fair employment laws which had necessitated the enactment of Title VI1, 26 Congress
required that the EEOC permit those states with comprehensive laws a prior opportunity
to remedy employee complaints in accordance with state law.27 Several years after en-
actment, Congress amended Title VII to provide broader coverage of both private and
public sector employment and enhance the EEOC's authority to resolve employee corn-
plaints. 26 The intricate enforcement structure otherwise remained unchanged.
'" See infra notes 22-94 and accompanying text.
1 " See infra notes 95-149 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 176-231 and accompanying text.
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. Title VII expressly
applies to employers in industries "affecting commerce." See 701(b), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b).
" Sec supra note 1.
" See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
21' See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
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A. The Text of Title VII
Title VII contains an expansive prohibition of private and public sector employment
discrimination 2s and particularly describes the roles of the EEOC," state agencies re-
sponsible for enforcing state fair employment laws,'' and federal district courts" in
furtherance of its purposes. The Title VII enforcement procedure is set in motion when
an employee files a charge with the EEOC. 33 If, however, the alleged discriminatory
practice occurred in a state that has authorized state agency enforcement of a state law
comparable to Title Vii, Title VII directs that the employee exhaust the state adminis-
trative remedy before filing a charge with the EEOC. 34 Consequently, if the employee
first pursues relief with the EEOC, the EEOC refers the charge to the state agency and
postpones consideration of the charge until state agency proceedings end." Once the
deferral requirement has been satisfied, the EEOC serves notice of the charge on the
employer and investigates the employee's allegations." If the EEOC concludes on the
basis of its investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has
occurred," it will try to persuade the employer to settle the disputes" by agreeing to
eliminate the discriminatory practice and to provide appropriate relief to the employee."
Should the employer be uncooperative, the EEOC may file a civil action against the
employer. 4U
• § 701, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, § 2000e-2.
30 See 705(a), 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-4(a), which creates the EEOC, and § 706(a),(b),(f ), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(a),(b),(f), which set forth the EEOC's general powers of enforcement.
31 § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Title VII specifies state and local agencies. Id. Express
references in this note to states and state agencies implicitly include political subdivisions of states
and local agencies. See also § 709(b),(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b),(d), which authorizes EEOC coop-
eration with state agencies in the enforcement of Title VII.
• § 706(f )(3)-(5) and (g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)-(5) and (g).
• § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Ordinarily, filing must be within 180 days after the alleged
violation occurred. § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
34 § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The EEOC defers to state agencies only where the state law
and enforcement standards are comparable to the Title VII standards. See 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
451:1 (1984). EEOC regulations authorize deferral where (1) the state fair employment law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and (2) the state enforce-
ment agency provides remedies for discrimination by granting or seeking relief or initiating criminal
proceedings. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a)(1),(2) (1985). For a list of state agencies qualifying for deferral,
see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1985) ("designated 706 agencies").
33 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(5) (1985). Once state administrative proceedings terminate, EEOC
investigation commences automatically without the need for a second employee filing. See Love v.
Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1972).
ss § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
37 Id. The EEOC gives substantial weight to final findings and orders in state proceedings. Id.;
29 C.F.R. § 1601.76 (1985). In addition, there are certain state agencies whose findings and reso-
lutions the EEOC will not simply accord substantial weight but will accept as conclusive, provided
EEOC review is not otherwise required. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.80 (1985) ("Certified designated 706
agencies"). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.75 (1985) for the certification procedure. Agencies qualifying for
such deferential EEOC treatment are subject to disqualification. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.79 (1985). The
EEOC reviews the performance of each qualifying agency either a minimum of every three years
or whenever the EEOC, on review, has rejected a significant proportion of the state agency's findings.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.78 (1985).
• § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
39 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1985).
40 § 706(f )(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(I). Where the employer is a government, governmental
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In some instances, however, the EEOC will either decline to prosecute for lack of
reasonable cause" or fail to prosecute or settle with the employer within a reasonable
time." When the EEOC refuses or fails to act on the complaint, the EEOC must so
inform the employee, who then has the right to file a civil action against the employer
within ninety days of receiving EEOC notification." The civil action is not limited in
scope to review of the EEOC determination but secures for the employee a trial de
novo.'"
Title VII confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to hear Title VII actions"
and dictates the procedures which govern Title VII actions. Title VII actions are tried
before a judge, not a jury:16 The judge must act in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in appointing a master to hear the case" or in granting preliminary
or temporary relief." If the court finds that the employer intentionally has engaged in
discriminatory practices, Title Vii provides that the court may order appropriate equi-
table relief, including but not limited to reinstatement and back pay." The court also
may in its discretion award a prevailing employee attorney's fees as part of costs. 5° Finally,
any appeal of the district court's decisions is subject to requirements set forth in federal
appeals statutes. 5 ' The enumerated requirements signify that Title VII trials must con-
form with federal court procedures.
As the text of Title VII clearly indicates, Congress contemplated that both the
federal courts and various state administrative proceedings would play a role in Title
VII. In contrast, however, the text of the statute does not indicate whether Congress
approved of state court participation in Title VII enforcement. Consequently, courts
agency, or political subdivision, the EEOC must refer the case to the Attorney General, who then
may bring a civil action against the employer. Id.
706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
47 The EEOC must prosecute or reach settlement within 180 days after the employee files the
charge or state proceedings terminate. ft 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1)(1).
45 Id. Similarly, where the employer is a government, governmental agency, or political subdi-
vision and the EEOC has referred the case to the Attorney General, who decides not to pursue the
case, the Attorney General must give the employee an opportunity to file a civil action. Id.
" See 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964) (Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152
Submitted Jointly by Senator Joseph S. Clark and Senator Clifford P. Case, Floor Manager) (here-
inafter Interpretive Memorandum of Title VIII.
45 § 706(0(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). See supra note 7.
411
	 § 706(f)(4), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(4). The legislative history confirms that Congress
intended judges to try Title VII actions. See 118 CONG. REC. 4917, 4919-20 (1972) (remarks of
Senators Ervin and javits preceding Senate rejection of amendment to require jury trial of Title
VII actions for backpay); Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, supra note 44, at 7214 (judge
trial is customary practice for suits for injunctive relief). See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 420 n.13 (1975).
47 § 706(f)(5), 42 U.S,C. I 2000e-5(f )(5) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 53).
48 § 706(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (citing Fen. R. Clv. P. 65).
4tt 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). An employee may also seek relief under state law because
Title Vii expressly does not preempt state laws consistent with the purposes of Title VII. 708,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
▪ § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The Supreme Court has construed the fees provision
broadly to permit recovery even where a plaintiff prevails in state administrative and judicial
proceedings on deferral and requires no additional equitable relief under Title VII. See New York
Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 66, 71 (1980).
• § 706(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (citing 28 U.S.C. §1 1291-1292).
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have turned to the legislative history of Title VII for evidence of congressional intent
regarding the jurisdiction of state courts in Title VII actions.
B. The Legislative History of Title VII
Title VII was part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Congress enacted in
response to the nationwide persistence of racial and other discrimination against minority
groups and the inadequacy of state efforts to combat discrimination." Congress partic-
ularly was concerned about the deficiency of state remedies for discrimination . with
regard to black Americans because state laws either provided no remedy for the wrongs
done to black Americans or affirmatively denied them rights." Proponents of the Civil
Rights Act asserted that federal legislation and federal remedies would benefit black
Americans and thereby benefit the nation." The Civil Rights Act addressed discrimi-
natory conduct in several contexts," with discrimination in employment being the focus
of Title VII."
To assure that Congress's authority to establish broadly applicable federal fair em-
ployment standards was unassailable, Congress justified the proposed Title VII legisla-
tion as an exercise . of its regulatory power under the commerce clause." Opponents
denounced the Civil Rights Act generally as an unjustified federal intrusion on the police
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2355, 2393-94 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 914]. The bill that gave rise to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 originated in recommendations from President Kennedy to Congress in February of 1963.
109 CONG. REG. 3245 (1963) (H.R. Doc, No. 75). In his message to Congress, the President observed
that although the Emancipation Proclamation had abolished slavery 100 years earlier, black Amer-
icans continued to suffer unequal treatment and opportunity. Id. The President resolved that
Congress and the executive branch should focus efforts on eliminating discrimination in the areas
of voting, education, employment, and public accommodations. Id. at 3245-49. In June of 1963,
in the wake of mounting racial tension in the South, the President delivered another message to
Congress, declaring the urgent need for a national solution to discrimination. 109 CONG. REC.
11174, 11175 (1963) (H.R. Doc. No. 124). Accompanying the message was the Administration's
proposed bill, which represented the concerted efforts of the Administration and members of
Congress. Id. at 11075-76, 11179.
55
 109 CONG. REC. at 11174-75.
54
 In his second message to Congress, President Kennedy expressed concern that the result of
continued denial of equal treatment to black Americans would be their increasing frustration and
resort to violence. The escalation of violence, the President warned, would impede the nation's
economic and social progress and undermine the worldwide respect which the nation enjoyed. The
President therefore considered prompt Congressional action to be essential. Id. at 11175.
55 H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 52, at 2392-93.
56 Id. at 2401. The Kennedy Administration hoped that a federal fair employment law would
increase employment of black Americans, whom unemployment and poverty affected dispropor-
tionately, and eventually foster economic growth. 109 CONG. REG. 11174, 11177 (1963) (H.R. Doc.
No. 124); Civil Rights — The President's Program, 1963: Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1730 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, 104-05 (1963) (statement of Robert F.
Kennedy, United States Attorney General) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1731].
Other titles of the Civil Rights Act addressed discrimination in voting, public facilities, federally
assisted programs, and public education. H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 52, at 2392-93.
" Congress received assurances from respected legal authorities that Title VII was a valid
exercise of the commerce power. See 110 CONG. REC. 7052-54 (1964) (letter and memorandum of
twenty-two attorneys and law school deans on proposed Title II and Title VII); id. at 8453-56
(memorandum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on proposed Title VII).
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powers of states and the right to privacy of both business enterprises and individuals,"
Title VII appeared to opponents to be an unconstitutional extension of the authority
that the commerce clause confers on the federal legislature. 59 The legislation ultimately
enacted would establish a national policy prohibiting employment discrimination, but
preserve the effect of state laws that were comparable to Title VII in providing remedies
for employment discrimination.fi° It was in Title VII enforcement provisions that Con-
gress expressly allowed for state regulation of fair employment under state law.
To assure that the purposes of Title VII would be accomplished, Congress created
a multi-tiered enforcement scheme comprising state and federal administrative proceed-
ings and federal judicial proceedings. First, Congress created the EE0C,61 thereby pro-
viding statutory authority for an already existing Presidential committee on equal em-
ployment opportUnity.° The newly formed EEOC had authority to investigate
discrimination complaints° and to seek informal resolution of disputes through em-
ployer cooperation. 64
In delineating the EEOC's authority, however, Congress required that the EEOC
defer to state administrative agencies responsible for enforcing state fair employment
"See, e.g., id. at 15880-81, 15890-91 (1964) (remarks of Representatives Abbitt and Flynt
prior to House approval of Civil Rights Act). Representatives of the southern states were among
the opponents of the proposed legislation, which would have a substantial impact on the South.
Southern representatives asserted that congressional consideration of the civil rights bill had focused
unfairly an discrimination in the South, despite evidence of discrimination in other parts or the
country. See, e.g., id. at 15880-81 (remarks of Rep. Roberts of Alabama); id. at 15882 (remarks of
Rep. Rivers of South Carolina). Similarly, governors of the southern states were not among the 37
governors (three governors of territories) who urged prompt enactment. Id. at 14510-11 (remarks
of Sen. Dirksen).
59 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No, 914, supra note 52, at 2431, 2434 (opponents' views on proposed
Civil Rights Act). Title II, the public accommodations provision, also premised on the commerce
clause, provoked similar reactions. Id.
(") See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
61 Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, $ 705(a), 78 Stat. 258 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-
4(a) (1982)).
162 Hearings on S. 1731, supra note 56, at 104 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, United States
Attorney General). The Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, overseen by Vice President
Johnson, was created by executive order in 1961 and administered a fair employment program
which applied to the federal government and federal government contractors. Id.; Interpretive
Memorandum of Title VII, supra note 44, at 7215. Congress deemed statutory recognition of the
committee, through the proposed Title VII, important because the lack of statutory authority had
created funding problems far the committee, which depended on agencies and departments for
support. 109 CONG. REC. 11076 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
In contrast to the authority of the Presidential committee and the proposed authority or the
EEOC set forth in the Administration's bill, see 109 CONG. REG. 11081 (1963), the EEOC's authority
under Title VII, as enacted, extended only to private employers. Pub, L. 88-352, title VII, $ 701(a),
(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964). The federal government remained exempt from regulation until Congress
amended Title VII in 1972. See Pub. L. 88.352, title VII, $ 701(b), 78 Stat, 253 (1964); Pub. L. 92-
261, $ I I, 86 Stat. 111-13 (1972).
"3 Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, $ 706(a), $ 709—$ 710, 78 Stat. 259, 262-64 (1964) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. $$ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8, 2000e-9).
64 Pub. L. 88.352, title VII, $ 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-
5(b)). Under Title VII, as originally enacted, if the EEOC could not procure the employer's
voluntary compliance, the EEOC gave the employee an opportunity to sue the employer in federal
district court. Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, $ 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964).
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laws. 68 At the time that Congress was considering the Title VII legislation, nearly half
of the states already regulated employment discrimination. 86 Supporters of the federal
bill nonetheless concluded that national legislation was necessary in light of the sizable
proportion of black American employees who lived in states lacking fair employment
laws.° Consequently, Congress drafted Title VII to provide a federal fair employment
standard which would protect employees in states without fair employment laws but not
preempt existing state fair employment laws. 68 Thus, in states with their own fair em-
ployment laws, Title VII would supplement the state law to the extent the state law
protection fell short of the protection provided under Title VII. As is evident from the
supplemental role that Title VII would play with regard to state fair employment laws,
Congress intended that other remedies, whether under federal or state law, would
continue to be available notwithstanding the enactment of Title VII.69
Finally, the broad investigatory power that Congress accorded the EEOC was subject
to the ultimate authority of the federal courts.' 8 Title VII authorized the district courts
not simply to review the findings of the EEOC and state administrative proceedings, but
also to conduct a trial de novo 73 to determine whether the employer had discriminated. 72
Congress contemplated that the judicial proceeding would protect the employer from
Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 706(6), 78 Stat. 259-60 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c)).
"6 Equal Employment Opportunity; Hearings on H.R. 405 and Similar Bills Before the General Subcomm.
on Labor of the House of Representatives Comm. on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 499-557
(1963) (synopsis and charts of state law provisions, prepared by Library of Congress) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 405j. Twenty-three states prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, and/or age: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 550-51, 556-57. In addition, Iowa's legislature had passed a reso-
lution disapproving of employment discrimination, id. at 516, Louisiana law prohibited age discrim-
ination alone, id. at 550-51, and both Maryland and Virginia had appointed study commissions on
employment discrimination. Id. Only Wisconsin law, like Title VII, prohibited sex discrimination.
Id. See Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (1964).
Opponents of the proposed legislation contended that in view of the extensive state regulation,
Title VII was unnecessary. See Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, supra note 44, at 7219.
67 Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, supra note 44, at 7214; 110 CONG. REC. at 7217
(printed remarks of Sen. Clark in response to opponents of Title VII). None of the southern states
had fair employment laws. See supra note 66.
6" 1 10  CONG. REC. 7216, 7216-17 (1964) (written responses of Sen. Clark to Sen. Dirksen)
(hereinafter Clark-Dirkseith Interpretive Memorandum of Title V1I, supra note 44, at 7214. Pro-
ponents hoped that deferral would induce more states to enact and enforce their own laws, thereby
freeing the EEOC to concentrate on the remaining uncooperative states. Clark-Dirksen, supra, at
7216-17.
"9 See 110 CONG. REC. at 7207 (remarks of Sen. Clark to Sen. Hill); id. at 13650-52 (Senate
rejection of proposed amendment to make Title VII an exclusive remedy for unlawful employment
practices). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 and n.9 (1974). For
federal employees, however, Title VII currently provides the exclusive judicial remedy. See Brown
v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828-29 (1976).
7"Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 706(f), (g), 78 Stat. 260-61 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f), (g)).
7 ' See Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, supra note 44, at 7213.
72 Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(0).
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overzealous EEOC investigation" and also assure the employee of an additional forum
for relief where the EEOC was slow or unable to negotiate a remedy."
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII." In addition to expanding the coverage : of
Title VII to include a broader range of private and public sector employment,' 8 the
1972 amendment strengthened the EEOC's enforcement authority. Under Title VII ,as
enacted in 1964, the EEOC's ability to resolve disputes depended on the voluntary,
compliance of the employer," If the employer was uncooperative, the EEOC could,do,
nothing more than give the employee an opportunity to sue." Because of its limited
authority, the EEOC was unable to address adequately the increasing number of charges
being filed." In hearings on the proposed amendment of Title VII, the 1,),e;partment of
Justice recommended that Congress authorize the EEOC to file civil, actions against
uncooperative employers, 88 rather than confer quasi-judicial powEers i on the EEOC.81
Congress ultimately agreed with the Department of Justice, The 1972 amendment
extended to the EEOC the authority to initiate civil actions against employers 82
7 ' See H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 52, at 2515-16 (additional views of seven members of
Judiciary Committee); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 474.
74 Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)( 1 )).
7' Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92.261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
76 One consequence of the 1972 amendment was that Title VII applied to employment by state
and local governments. Pub. L. 92-261, § 2(1),(2), 86 Stat. 103 (197'2). Title VII as originally enacted
expressly exempted states and political subdivisions. Pub. L. 88-352, title Vii, § 701(a),(b), 78 Stat.
253 (1964). Another effect of the 1972 amendment was extension of Title VII to a broader range
of private employment. Pub. L. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (employers with 15 or iliOire
employees). compare Title VII as originally enacted. Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 701(h), 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (employers with 25 or more employees). Finally, the 1972 amendment extended Title VII
coverage to the federal government. Pub. L. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111-13 (1972), which had been
exempt under Title VII as originally enacted. Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 70 l(a);(6), 78 Stat. 241
(1964).
77 Pub, L. 88-352, title VII, § 706(c), 78 Stat. 260 (1964), See 110 CONG. REC. 15865-66 (1964)
(A Concise Explanation of die Civil Rights Act of 1964, submitted by Sen. Humphrey).
74 See id.
79 See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., '2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2137, 2139-41, 2144 (hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 238).
e) See Equal Employment Opportaiiities Enforcement Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 251$, S. 2617, H.R.
1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 9'2d Cong., 1st
Sess. 49, 125-29 (1971) (stateniein of David Norman, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, Department of justice) [hereinafter 1971 Hearings]. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 475 n.15.
"i The EEOC recommended that Congress authorize the EEOC to issue cease-and-desist orders.
1971 Hearings, supra note 80, at 54-55 (statement of William H. Brown, III, Chairman, EEOC).
The proposal was similar to proposals whidt Congress had rejected in enacting Title Vii in 1964.
I4.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 52, at 2515-16 (additional views of seven members of the Committee
on the judiciary). The Department of Justice countered that district courts should continue to be
and were more suitable than the EEOC as the final fact-finding forum under Title VII. 1971
Hearings, supra note 80, at 125. The Department of justice asserted that there was greater respect
for and confidence in judicial proceedings, district court judges had the requisite expertise, and
judicial resolution of disputes would be faster. Id. at 126. Contributing to the federal courts' greater
efficiency, the Department added, would be their capacity to handle company-wide or industry-
wide disputes encompassing numerous individual complaints of the type the EEOC normally
handles. Id. at 127-29.
xs Pub. L. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 105 (1972). In 1978, the EEOC became the federal agency
with primary responsibility in the area of employment discrimination when the President stream-
lined federal lair employment regulation through Reorganization Plan No. 1.92 Stat. 3781, reprinted
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but preserved the status of the federal district courts as the final fact-finding
forum."
As in the text of Title VII, Congress did not expressly address state court jurisdiction
in the legislative history of Title VII." Congress's primary concern was with assuring
the availability of the new federal remedy through the EEOC and the federal courts,
but without disabling the states from providing state law remedies for employment
discrimination." What the legislative history failed to indicate clearly, however, was
whether the states were authorized to provide the federal law remedy. Even when
Congress amended Title VII in 1972, the issue of state court authority to provide Title
VII relief remained unresolved." Consequently, because both the text and legislative
history of Title VII are inconclusive on the issue of state court jurisdiction under Title
VII, courts have looked to Supreme Court decisions for guidance.
C. Supreme Court Decisions
There is no Supreme Court decision that is conclusive as to the role Congress
intended for state courts under Title VII. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that it
has not yet decided the issue of state court jurisdiction to hear Title VII actions 87 The
Court thus has negated any inferences to the contrary that might be drawn from prior
decisions."
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, at 39-40. The Plan transferred to the EEOC fair employment functions
which the Department of Labor, Department of Justice, Civil Service Commission, Equal Employ.
ment Opportunity Council, and various agencies previously had handled. See id. at 40-42 (Message
of the President). The Reorganization Plan was an exercise of the authority Congress conferred on
the President to reorganize executive branch agencies in the interest of administrative efficiency
and implementation of laws. See 5 U.S.C. § 901-912 (1982). Section 901(d) authorizes the President
to determine what changes are necessary where a review of agency functions reveals overlapping
responsibilities. Pursuant to Section 903, the President then must prepare and submit to Congress
a plan for reorganization. Section 906 provides that unless Congress disapproves of the plan, the
plan automatically becomes effective after a sixty-day period when Congress is in session.
83 706(f )(3),(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(3),(g). Congress also retained the deferral provisions
on the ground that states often are best suited to handle violations occurring within their borders.
H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 79, at 2154.
" There were numerous references in the legislative history to the federal district courts because
the proposed legislation referred to the federal district courts. See, e.g., Interpretive Memorandum
of Title VII, supra note 44, at 7213-14; 110 CONG. REC. 17243, 17244 (1964) (Summary of the
Basic Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, submitted by Sen. Burton). In contrast, there was
little reference to state courts. During an exchange between Senators Dirksen and Clark, there was
a fleeting reference to state courts. Clark-Dirksen, supra note 68, at 7216. Senator Dirksen observed
that if coverage under the proposed Title VII overlapped with existing state law, an employer could
conceivably be subject to simultaneous federal and state court suits and possibly conflicting results
regarding the same discriminatory act. Senator Clark, in response, explained that Title VII would
not preempt any state or local regulation consistent with the purposes of Title VII. Moreover,
Senator Clark continued, the EEOC would defer to any state that had and was effectively enforcing
an adequate state lam Id. (Both Senator Clark and Senator Dirksen were sponsors of the Senate
civil rights bills. See 109 CONG. REC. 11084, 11541 (1963)).
as See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
"6
 See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
"7 Kremer, 456 U.S. at 479 n.20. The Court stated that "[w]e of course do not decide in this
case whether jurisdiction to entertain Title VII claims is limited to federal courts." Id.
" Id. See Alexander, 415 U.S. 36; Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981). In Alexander, the
Supreme Court considered whether by prior submission of an employment grievance to arbitration,
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet offered a definitive interpretation of the
Title VII jurisdictional statute, the Court has set forth the principle it applies in inter-
preting federal jurisdictional statutes. In Claflin a. Houseman," decided in 1876, the
Supreme Court considered whether federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of actions
arising under federal statutes. The Court concluded that state courts of general juris-
diction have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in cases arising under the federal
Constitution, laws, and treaties, provided Congress neither expressly nor impliedly pro-
hibits state court jurisdiction."" Where Congress has not expressly prohibited concurrent
jurisdiction, the Court explained, "incompatibility" between the state court's exercise of
jurisdiction and the subject matter involved would be evidence of Congress's implicit
intent to preclude state court jurisdiction. 91 The trend since Claflin has favored concur-
an employee had waived the option of filing a Title VII action in federal court. Alexander, 415 U.S.
at 38. The Court concluded that the employee still could bring an action under Title Vii, noting
that the trial court, in its discretion, could consider the arbitral decision as evidence. Id. at 59-60.
In reaching its conclusion, the Alexander Court made statements which seemed to indicate the
Court's conclusion that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under Title VII. First, the Court
observed that "final responsibility for enforcement of Title Vii is vested with federal courts," as
opposed to the EEOC. Id. at 44. Next, the Court noted, Title VII expressly provides for several
forums, namely, the EEOC, state and local agencies, and the federal courts. Id. at 47. Moreover,
the Court continued, because Title VII provides a supplemental remedy, an employee still is free
to pursue other remedies under federal and state law. Id. at 48-49 and n.9. The Court concluded
that for a court to grant preclusive effect to arbitral rather than judicial proceedings would be
inappropriate because "Congress intended federal Courts to exercise final responsibility for en-
forcement of Title Vii." Id. at 56-58.
In Lehman, the Supreme Court made similar remarks in concluding that a federal employee
asserting a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was not entitled to a
jury trial. Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160-64. The Court relied in part on the fact that Title Vii enforce-
ment provisions, on which the corresponding ADEA provisions are based, do not afford a right to
a jury trial. Id. at 163-64. While endeavoring to explain why the federal district courts, rather than
the federal Court of Claims, have jurisdiction of ADEA claims against the government, the Lehman
Court first noted that federal district courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of ADEA
claims against private employers. Id. at 164 n.12, With regard to ADEA claims against the govern-
ment, however, the Court observed that Congress had restricted jurisdiction to the district courts
to avoid the circumstance of state courts hearing claims against the federal government. Id. The
Court then added that "le)xclusive district court jurisdiction is also consistent with jurisidictional
references in Title VII" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(I)(3), which confers jurisdiction on the district
courts, and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), which gives federal employees the right to file an action in
district court). Id. For a discussion of cases where courts, both prior to and since Kremer, have relied
on the language in Alexander and Lehman to conclude that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
under Title VII, see infra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
" 93 U.S. 130, 135 (1876). The particular statute was the Bankrupt Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14
Stat. 517. 93 U.S. at 130.
,,,, C/a//in, 93 U.S. at 136-,37. In support of its conclusion, the Court cited several precedents.
First, the Court referred to Alexander Hamilton's analysis, in THE FEDERALIST No. 82, of federal
legislative and judicial authority. Id. at 138, The. Court noted that Hamilton had concluded that
federal judicial authority, like legislative authority, should be exclusive only where Congress ex-
pressly so provides and state courts should have jurisdiction where Congress does not prohibit it.
Id. Second, the Court observed that there were no lower federal courts until the Judiciary Act of
Sept. 24, 1789. Id. at 139. Even with the creation of lower federal courts, however, the Court noted
that there was an underlying presumption that absent Congressional provision to the contrary, state
courts would continue to exercise jurisdiction, but concurrently with the new federal courts. Id.
Finally, the Court cited its prior endorsement of the concurrent jurisdiction principle in Houston
v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 26-28 (1820). Claflen, 93 U.S. at 141.
91 Claffin, 93 U.S. at 136. Some commentators have suggested that the Court discard the C/aflin
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rent state court jurisdiction to hear federal law claims, with exclusive federal court
jurisdiction being the exception rather than the rule 92
In 1981, however, the Court expanded upon the notion that Congress implicitly can
prohibit state court jurisdiction of federal question suits. In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Corp., the Court reiterated the Claflin rule that state courts have jurisdiction of federal
claims absent congressional prohibition." The Court added, however, that the presump-
tion of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted not only by explicit congressional pro-
hibition but also by unmistakable implication from legislative history or by a clear
incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests. 94
II. SELECT DECISIONS ON THE TITLE VII jutusoicriont ISSUE
Because neither the text nor the legislative history of Title VII contains an express
congressional provision for state courts, the issue of state court jurisdiction under Title
VII must be resolved through the implication of congressional intent. Federal and state
courts have found differing implications of congressional intent in the text and legislative
history of Title VII and consequently have reached different conclusions regarding the
jurisdiction of state courts under Title VII. Because the text and legislative history of
Title VII contain references only to federal courts, several courts have concluded that
Congress implicitly intended that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under Title
VII 95 Other courts, however, have relied on the absence of prohibitions regarding state
courts, rather than the affirmative references to federal courts, to conclude that state
courts have Title VII jurisdiction concurrently with federal courts. 96
Several lower federal and state courts have concluded that federal courts have
principle. They assert that Congress and the courts manifest inconsistent understanding of the
principle and the principle itself, particularly the concept of implicit Congressional intent to confer
exclusive jurisdiction, is flawed. See Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State
Court, 76 MICH. L. REV. 311,313-40 (1976).
" Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,507-08 (1962). Dowd Box concerned the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 jurisdictional provision, which indicates that suits "may
be brought in any district court of the United States ...." Id. at 502-03 & n.l. The Court applied
the Claflin principle to uphold the state court's exercise of jurisdiction over a collective bargaining
complaint under the Act. Id, at 506.
" Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,477-78 (1981).
94 Id. at 478. In Gulf, the Court upheld a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over the personal
injury claim of a Gulf employee working on a platform on the Outer Continental Shelf. Id. at 484.
The Outer Continental Shelf Land Act expressly confers "exclusive federal jurisdiction" with regard
to the Outer Continental Shelf. Id. at 479. The Court concluded on the basis of the legislative
history, however, that exclusive federal regulation of Shelf resources did not compel exclusive
federal court jurisdiction of Shelf workers' personal injury claims. Id. at 482-83. The Court further
noted that the factors which normally favor exclusive federal court jurisdiction — desirability of
uniform interpretation, federal judge expertise on federal law, and the presumed greater hospitality
of federal courts to federal claims — were absent. Id. at 483-84. Finally, the Court observed,
concurrent state court jurisdiction would afford injured workers the option of pursuing claims in
a "familiar, convenient, and possibly less expensive [forum)." Id. at 484.
95 See infra notes 97-123 and accompanying text.
98 See infra notes 122-49 and accompanying text.
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exclusive jurisdiction under Title VII.0 Insofar as they have discussed their reasoning,"
these courts have indicated that the affirmative references to federal courts in the text
and legislative history of Title VII, as well as Congress's incorporation of state admin-
istrative proceedings but not state judicial proceedings, are evidence of Congress's im-
plicit intent to exclude state courts from Title VII jurisdiction."
For example, in 1978, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan
concluded in Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp.") that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
of Title VII actions. The plaintiff in Dickinson, upon receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue
letter, sued in state court, alleging race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII
and state law."" The defendant removed the action to federal court and then moved
for dismissa1. 102 The defendant alleged that federal district courts have exclusive juris-
diction of Title VII actions, so the plaintiff's filing in state court did not satisfy the
requirement that an employee file suit within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue
letter. The plaintiff contended that his state court filing satisfied the ninety-day filing
requirement because the state court had jurisdiction. Alternatively, the plaintiff claimed
that under the principle of equitable tolling, the state court filing should suffice to
preserve the Title VII claim.'" The district court held that the state court lacked original
jurisdiction and the federal district court therefore lacked derivative jurisdiction on
removal."N In addition, the court refused to apply the principle of equitable tolling to
97 For cases, other than those discussed in this section, where courts have concluded that federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII claims, see McCloud v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
25 FEP Cases 513, 515 (D.D.C. 1981) (D.C. Court of Appeals has found exclusive jurisdiction);
Lucas v. Tanner Bros. Contracting Co., 10 FEP Cases 1104, 1104 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1974) (Title VII
impliedly requires that actions be brought in federal court); Bowers v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280
A.2d 772, 774 (D.C. 1971) (Title VII confers jurisdiction on federal courts); Fox v. Eaton Corp.,
48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 237-38, 358 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1976) (Title VII confers jurisdiction on federal
courts). See also Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1083 & n.4, 1084 & n.5
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the jurisdiction issue
is in dispute but also noted that the concurrent jurisdiction argument is questionable).
99 Several courts have provided only perfunctory explanations of their decisions. See supra note
97.
w See supra note 97; see infra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
"m 456 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
101 Id. at 44. The plaintiff received an EEOC right-to-sue letter on February 18, 1976, and filed
a complaint in state court on February 26, 1976. Id.
"" Id. The defendant, who was not served with the complaint until July 7, 1976, removed to
federal court on July 23, 1976. Id.
1
"3 Id. For a discussion of the equitable tolling principle, see Note, The Seventh Circuit's Refor-
mulation of the Equitable Tolling Doctrine. 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 565 (1982). Although the purpose of
statutes of limitations is protection of defendants from stale claims, id. at 565, defendants may not
use the statutes to their unfair advantage. Id. at 5fi7. Hence, where the defendant commits a wrong
of which the plaintiff is unaware, either because the wrong naturally conceals itself or the defendant
actively conceals it, the statute is equitably tolled until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should
have discovered the wrong. Id. at 565, 567. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 340, 349-50
(1874).
04 Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 48. The Supreme Court set forth the standard on derivative
jurisdiction in Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922):
The jurisdiction of the federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative
jurisdiction. If the state court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties,
the federal court acquires none, although it might in a like suit originally brought
there have had jurisdiction.
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save the plaintiff's Title VII claim. 105 Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's
Title VII claim and remanded the state law claims to state court.m
The Dickinson court based its determination of exclusive jurisdiction on the legislative
history and text of Title VII. 107
 First, the court noted, the legislative history of Title VII
documents Congress's intent that the right to file a civil action under Title VII merely
supplement and not supplant .other remedies available under federal and state law.
Because other remedies for employment discrimination still are readily available, the
court reasoned that its holding that the Title VII remedy is exclusively federal would
not frustrate the remedial purpose of Title VII. 1 °8 Second, the district court observed
that Congress expressly provided for participation of only certain state bodies in the
enforcement of Title VII. The court cited by way of example the provisions incorporating
state administrative proceedings without mention of state courts. 09 Third, the district
court noted that all congressional discussion of the Title VII civil action presumed a
federal forum.m Further, the court continued, the text of Title VII confirms Congress's
presumption of a federal forum because it specifies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and federal statutes applicable only in federal courts."'
Six years after Dickinson, in 1984, the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
like the Dickinson court, concluded that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.under
Title VII. In Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc.," 2 the Ninth Circuit conceded the ambiguity of the
Title VII jurisdictional provision but found in other statutory provisions and the legis-
lative history Congress's implicit intent to make Title VII jurisdiction exclusively federal.
The plaintiff in Valenzuela filed suit in California state court, alleging sex discrimination
in violation of Title V11. 113 The defendant removed the case to federal court." 4 The
1 " Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 48. The court concluded that Burnett v. New York Central R.R.,
380 U.S. 424 (1965) was not controlling. Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 48. In Burnett, the plaintiff filed
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) in Ohio state court. Burnett, 380 U.S.
at 424. The state court had concurrent jurisdiction but dismissed for lack of venue under Ohio
law. Id. at 424-25. The plaintiff then filed an identical action in federal district court, which was
dismissed because the FELA statute of limitations had run. Id. at 425. The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff's timely filing in a state court with jurisdiction tolled the FELA limitations period
and the federal action therefore was timely. Id. at 426, 434-35. The Dickinson court distinguished
Burnett, where the Ohio state court had concurrent jurisdiction under the FELA, from the circum-
stances in Dickinson, where the state court lacked jurisdiction under Tide VII. Dickinson, 456 F.
Supp. at 48.
1°6 Dickinson, 456 F.Supp. at 48.
Id. at 45-47.
LOS
 Id. at 45.
"1 Id. at 46.
"° Id. at 46-47.
1 " Id. at 47. The district court also found language in Alexander, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), to be
compelling. Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 47 & n.8. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the limited significance of Alexander.
112 739 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit is the first federal court of appeals
to take a position on the Title VII jurisdiction issue. Other federal appeals courts have simply
addressed the issue without deciding it. See, e.g., Gunther, 612 F.2d at 1083 & n.4, 1084 & n.5
(concurrent jurisdiction questionable); Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 719 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981) (jurisdiction issue is difficult, particularly in the absence of language
expressly excluding state courts from jurisdiction); Patzer v. Board of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 855
n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (jurisdiction issue is undecided but the court will assume for purposes of decision
that state courts have jurisdiction).
," 739 F.2d at 435.
"4 Id.
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federal district court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal of the plaintiff's Title
VII claim concluding that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the Title
VII claim, and the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction on removal." The Ninth
Circuit affirmed." 6
In reaching its decision that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under Title
VII, the Valenzuela court first evaluated the provisions of Title VII in light of the Claflin
principle, as embellished by Gulf, Although state courts are presumed to have concurrent
jurisdiction of federal claims, the Ninth Circuit stated, Congress can rebut the presump-
tion by explicit provision, implication from legislative history, or incompatibility between
state court jurisdiction and federal interests. 1 i 7 .,The court acknowledged that the Title
VII jurisdictional provision alone, in simply authorizing federal courts to hear Title VII
claims, does not exclude the possibility of state court jurisdiction. Looking beyond the
jurisdictional provision, however, the court found a clear implication of exclusive federal
court jurisdiction. 118 Citing the Title VII requirement that court proceedings accord with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal appeals statutes, the Valenzuela court
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to regulate the procedures and priorities
of the state courts."' The court therefore concluded that the incorporation of federal
procedure is evidence that Congress contemplated an exclusively federal forurn. 12" Turn-
ing to the legislative history, the court stated that the express references to federal courts
and absence of references to state courts suggest congressional intent to make jurisdiction
exclusively federa1. 121
Thus, in Dickinson and Valenzuela, lower federal courts concluded on the basis of
language in the Title VII text and legislative history that Congress implicitly intended
to confine Title VII jurisdiction to federal courts. Both courts found support for their
interpretations of congressional intent in the statutory requirement that federal court
procedure govern Title VII actions and Congress's affirmative references, in the legis-
lative history, to federal courts.
Other courts, however, have found nothing in the Title VII text or legislative history
to rebut the presumption that state courts have jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims.
Accordingly, a few lower federal and state courts have concluded that state courts have
15 Id. The district court decision was out of the Central District of California. Id. at 436. In an
earlier case, a different judge in the Central District had concluded that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction. See Salem v. La Salle High School, 31 FEP Cases 10, 10-11 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
""Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 436. The plaintiff subsequently refiled her Title VII action in federal
district court, where the defendant alleged that the filing was not timely and moved for judgment
on the pleadings. The district court concluded that the plaintiff's earlier state court filing tolled
the ninety-day filing period, and denied defendant's motion. 801 F.2d 1170, 1171-72 (9th Cir.
1987). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the circumstances — plaintiff's mistaken but
diligent filing in state court, and the interest in furthering the remedial purpose of Title VII —
were sufficient to justify the district court's resort to equitable tolling. Id. at 1174-75.
117 739 F.2d at 435.
field.
111' Id. at 435-36.
12411d.
121 Id. at 436. In support of its conclusion, the Valenzuela court also cited language from
Alexander, 415 U.S. 36 at 47 (enumeration of EEOC, state and local agencies and federal courts as
forums available to Title VII plaintiff), and Lehman, 453 U.S. at 164 n.12 (exclusive federal
jurisdiction of ADEA actions is consistent with jurisdictional references in Title VII). Valenzuela,
739 F.2d at 436. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited
significance of Alexander and Lehman.
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jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims.t 22 Generally, these courts have relied on the Claflin
principle that state courts have jurisdiction of federal law claims, absent evidence of
congressional intent to the contrary.'" That Congress expressly authorized federal court
jurisdiction, the courts indicate, does not compel the conclusion that Congress intended
federal courts to have exclusive jurisdiction under Title VII.'"
For example, in 1976, the federal district court for the District of New Jersey
concluded in Bennun v. Board of Governors' 25 that state courts exercise concurrent juris-
diction with federal courts over suits arising under Title VII. The district court deter-
mined that the text and legislative history of Title VII neither expressly nor implicitly
prohibit state court jurisdiction, so state courts are authorized to hear Title VII claims.' 26
The plaintiff in Bennun, a Rutgers University professor, sued individual faculty members
and the university in New Jersey state court, alleging wrongful denial of tenure under
state law and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. 127 The slate court tried the
action and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.'" One month after filing the state court
action, the plaintiff commenced an action against the same parties in federal district
court, alleging wrongful denial of tenure in violation of Title VII and other federal
law.' 26 The plaintiff sought damages and back pay.'" Shortly after the plaintiff filed his
federal suit, the university granted him tenure."'
Three years after commencing the federal court action, and while it was pending,
the plaintiff filed a second federal court action, alleging continued discriminatory treat-
ment in violation of Title VII.'" The district court observed that the federal court claims
arose out of the same facts as the state law claims previously adjudicated in state court
152 For cases, other than those discussed in this section, where courts have concluded that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction under Title VII, see Greene v. County School lid., 524 F. Supp.
43, 44-45 (E.D. Va. 1981) (neither text nor legislative history of Title VII expressly or by necessary
implication vests federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction); Vason v. Carrano, 31 Conn. Supp. 338,
338, 330 A.2d 98, 98 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of suits
under federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §1 1981-2000h-6); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 74, 389 A.2d 465, 474-75 (1978) (Title V11 jurisdictional statute does not vest
federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction). See also Patzer, 577 F. Supp. at 1559 (Wisconsin district
court expressly did not decide the jurisdiction issue but said there appears to be no reason that a
state court may not hear a Title VII claim).
No federal court of appeals has determined that state courts have Title VII jurisdiction,
although one court has alluded to the possibility. See Fox, 615 F.2d at 710 & n.7 (Sixth Circuit
expressly did not decide the Title VII jurisdiction issue but noted that the issue is not an easy one,
particularly in the absence of any language expressly excluding state courts from jurisdiction).
123 the courts have cited the Claflin presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, they engage
in minimal discussion of their reasons for concluding that nothing in Title VII or its legislative
history forecloses state court jurisdiction of Title VII claims. See infra notes 137, 147 and accom-
panying text.
129 See infra notes 138-39.
125 4l3 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 (D.N.J. 1976).
126 1d. at 1279-80.
127 Id. at 1276.
128 Id. at 1277.
1 29 Id. The plaintiff also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and the fifth and
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and were merely different theories of recovery for the same injury)" If the plaintiff
could have asserted all federal claims in the earlier state court proceeding, the court
determined that principles of res judicata would bar the district court from hearing the
federal claims .'in both federal actions. 134 Addressing the Title VII claim, the court
concluded that state courts have jurisdiction under Title VII and the plaintiff therefore
could have asserted the Title VII claim in the prior state court trial)" The court
consequently dismissed both federal actions insofar as they related overwhelmingly to
events that the state court proceeding could have resolved.'"
In reaching its conclusion that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the Bennun
court relied on the Claflin principle that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction where
Congress neither expressly nor impliedly denies state court jurisdiction. ," First, the
court noted that although Title VII confers jurisdiction on the federal courts, the
jurisdictional language neither expressly nor impliedly vests the federal courts with
exclusive jurisdiction.'" The court briefly addressed the legislative history, stating only
that nothing in the history indicates congressional intent to create an exclusive federal
remedy)" Consequently, the Bennun court said, there was no reason to conclude that
state courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction under Title V11) 49
Three years after Bennun, in 1979, the federal district court for the Western District
of Texas adopted the Bennun court's approach in Peterson v. Eastern Airlines."' Acknowl-
edging decisions by other courts that Title VII jurisdiction is exclusively federal, the
district court nonetheless relied on the Claflin presumption of concurrent state court
jurisdiction to conclude that state courts have jurisdiction under Title VII. 142 The plain-
tiff in Peterson, after receiving a right-to-sue letter, filed a timely action in Texas state
court, alleging a racially discriminatory discharge in violation of Title VII and section
j" Id. at 1278.
' 34 Id. at 1279-80.
'" Id. at 1280. The court similarly concluded that the plaintiff could have asserted his section
1983 and section 1985 claims in state court. Id. at 1279. The court indicated summarily that
concurrent state court jurisdiction to hear section 1983 and section 1985 claims is established. Id,
134' Id. at 1280. Because the state court earlier had warned the plaintiff of the risk of splitting
claims, but the plaintiff had refused to consolidate the claims, the district court concluded that
dismissal would not be unfair. Id. The court, however, did permit the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint as to events following the state court proceedings. Id.
1 " Id. at 1279 (citing Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 and Dowd Box, 368 U.S. 502). See supra notes
89-94 and accompanying text.
Bennun, 413 F. Supp. at 1279, The court suggested, however, that actions initiated by the
Attorney General against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision might be the
exclusive province of federal courts, Id. See 706(f )(I) and § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and
2000e•6.
' 59 4l3 F. Supp. at 1280.
"U Id, at 1279. In 1978, the New Jersey Supreme Court held on the basis of Bennun that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of Title VII actions. See Peper, 77 N.J. at 74, 389 A.2d at 474-
75 (1978). But see Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 336 n.3 (D.N.J. 1979) (New Jersey
district court, without reference to its decision in Bennun, suggested that federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction under Title VII).
14'
	
FEI) Cases 1322, 1323 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
142 Id.
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1981 of Title 42. 14$ The defendant removed the case to federal court and then moved
for dismissal on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction.'"
The defendant contended that the state court lacked jurisdiction of the plaintiff's
claims because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of actions under Title VII and
section 1981. Moreover, the defendant asserted, if the plaintiff filed the Title VII and
section 1981 claims in a court lacking jurisdiction, then the filing did not toll the statute
of limitations for either claim. As a consequence, the defendant concluded, the district
court action was not timely because removal occurred after the statutory periods had
expired.' 45 The court rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that the state court
had original jurisdiction of the Title VII claim, as well as of the section 1981 claim, and
that the district court therefore had jurisdiction on removal. 146
In support of its conclusion that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under
Title VII, the Peterson court first cited the Claflin principle that state courts have juris-
diction of federal law claims unless Congress expressly or by implication makes jurisdic-
tion exclusively federal. 197 The court noted the split in federal and state authority
regarding the Title VII jurisdiction issue and the absence of a determinative Supreme
Court decision. 14" The court then concluded that it would follow the authority of Bennun
and similar decisions where courts have concluded that state courts have jurisdiction to
hear Title VII claims. "9
In sum, the absence of express congressional authorization or prohibition of state
court jurisdiction in either the text or legislative history of Title VII has led to conflicting
court conclusions regarding Congress's implicit intent. In some cases, the express au-
thorization of federal district court jurisdiction and requirement of federal court pro-
cedure in Title VII trials, combined with express preservation of state law remedies,
have persuaded courts that Congress implicitly intended only federal courts to hear Tide
VII claims. Other courts, however, have found nothing in the text or legislative history
that implicitly rebuts the presumption following from Claflin that state courts have
jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims.
I. IMPLICIT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION UNDER
TITLE VII
The jurisdictional provision in Title VII confers jurisdiction on federal district courts
without stating whether state courts have similar authority.'" Lower federal and state
145 Id. The plaintiff was discharged on April 17, 1977. The EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter
on December 18, 1978. The plaintiff filed the Title VII action on March 15, 1979, just before the
ninety-day period for filing would have elapsed. Id.
144 Id. Removal was on April 19, 1979. Id.
145 Id. A two-year statute of limitations under Texas law applied to section 1981 actions. Id.
146 Id.
147
 Id. at 1323. The Peterson court also cited an order in an earlier, unpublished decision where
the court had concluded that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under Title VII. Id. at 1323
& n.l.
' 45 Id. at 1323. The Peterson court noted that it would not construe the "loose language" in
Alexander, 415 U.S. 36, to mean that the Supreme Court had decided that federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. Peterson, 20 FEP Cases at 1323. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text
regarding the limited significance of Alexander.
149 Peterson, 20 FEP Cases at 1323. The EEOC, as amicus curiae, asserted that state courts have
jurisdiction under Title VII. Id.
706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
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courts therefore have looked to other Title VII provisions and the legislative history of
Title VII for evidence of implicit rather than express congressional intent regarding
state court authority to hear Title VII claims. The statutory text and legislative history
together suggest that Congress contemplated an exclusively federal forum for Title VII
actions.
Congress's implicit intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts emerges
in statutory language beyond the jurisdictional provision. First, Title VII trial proceed-
ings must accord with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the judge decides to
appoint a master to hear the case 151 or orders preliminary or temporary relief.' 52 In
addition, federal appeals statutes govern appeals from the trial judge's decisions.'" The
federal rules and statutes apply only to federal courts,'" not state court proceedings.
Given that Title VII actions must conform with federal procedure but state courts are
not bound by such federal provisions, state court jurisdiction of Title VII claims would
be inconsistent with the express statutory requirements. Both Claflin and Gulf instruct
that incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and the federal interest to be served
is sufficient to rebut the presumption that state courts have jurisdiction of federal
claims)" Thus, Congress's requirement that Title VII actions accord with federal pro-
cedure demonstrates Congress's implicit intent that federal courts have Title VII juris-
diction to the exclusion of state courts) 56
In addition to expressly authorizing federal courts and procedure, the language of
Title VII provides for only indirect state involvement in furthering the purposes of Title
VII. In delineating the authority of the EEOC and federal courts to enforce Title VII
directly, Congress expressly permitted the states to remedy employment discrimination
only through state agencies and in accordance with state fair employment laws)" When
a state has and is enforcing a fair employment law that is substantially similar to Title
VII, Title VII requires that the EEOC defer consideration of an employee's complaint
151 706(1 )(5), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 53, which sets forth the guide-
lines for district court appointment of a master and describes the extent of the master's authority).
in § 706(1)(2), 42 U.S.C. 12000e-5(f)(2) (citing FED. R. Giv. P. 65, which sets forth notice and
hearing requirements for issuance of preliminary injunctions or restraining orders).
155 § 706(9), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1982)). Section 1291 pro-
vides:
The courts of appeals .. , shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States except where a direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.G. § 1291 (1982). Section 1292 provides:
(a) [Tihe courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court
28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982).
154 FED. R. Ctv. P. I provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity ....
See supra note 153 for the text of the federal appeals statutes.
155 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
156 See Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 435-36; Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 47. See supra notes 100-23 and
accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 34, 65-69 and accompanying text.
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until the state agency has had an opportunity to resolve the dispute under state law in
state administrative proceedings.'" Congress, instead, might have authorized both state
agencies and state courts to enforce Title VII directly. That Congress did not confer
such authority, preferring to limit state agencies to enforcement of state law without any
mention of state courts, indicates that Congress intended to exclude state courts, as well
as state agencies, from hearing Title VII claims.' 59
Beyond the language of the statute itself is the legislative history of Title VII, which
explains Congress's motivation in drafting Title VII. Although Congress did not specif-
ically address the issue of state court jurisdiction in its consideration of Title VI1, 160 the
legislative history indicates that Congress implicitly intended federal courts to have
exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII claims.' 6 ' The inadequacy of state laws in eliminating
discrimination, particularly against black Americans, compelled Congress to enact the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, of which Title VII was part. 162 State laws were inadequate not
simply in failing to remedy discrimination but, in some states, in affirmatively perpetu-
ating discrimination.' 63 In the area of employment, half of the states, home to a majority
of black Americans, lacked laws prohibiting discrimination.'" Consequently, Congress
insisted on a federal fair employment remedy that would be available to the extent that
state remedies were inadequate.' 95 Congress was willing to defer to states in their en-
forcement of state fair employment law&" and would not preempt other state remedies
to the extent they were consistent with the purposes of Title VII. 157 Nonetheless, Con-
gress was reluctant to involve states, even those with fair employment laws, in direct
enforcement of Title VII, as opposed to state laws. Given the circumstances that spawned
the Civil Rights Act and Title VII, it is improbable that Congress would have considered
state courts to be suitable forums for the protection of Title VII rights.
Congress's implicit intent to exclude state courts from jurisdiction continued when
Congress amended Title VII in 1972. 165 The 1972 amendment extended the coverage
of Title VII to a wider range of employers, including state and local governments, 169
and, by authorizing the EEOC to sue employers, improved the EEOC's ability to handle
the rising volume of complaints.'" The expansion of Tide VII coverage indicates that
state regulation continued to be inadequate and suggests that Congress still would
166 706(c), 42 U.S.C. g 2000e-5(c).
159 See Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 46. There is further evidence that in enacting Title VII,
Congress contemplated state, and specifically state court, enforcement of only state law. Title VII
expressly provides that the federal fair employment provisions do not preempt state laws which
are consistent with the purposes of Title VII. § 708, 42 U.S.C. g 2000e-7. Because Title VII does
not restrict the authority of states to provide their own remedies for employment discrimination,
one reasonable conclusion is that federal courts should have exclusive authority to enforce the
federal remedy set forth in Title VII. See Dickinson, 456 F. Supp. at 45.
m See supra notes 52-86 and accompanying text.
Hi' See id.
' 62 See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
' 63 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
167 Sec supra note 69 and accompanying text.
168 Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
170
 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
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consider state courts to be inappropriate forums for enforcement of Title VII rights.
Moreover, although the expansion of Title VII coverage and the EEOC's authority was
likely to increase Title VII litigation in federal district courts, Congress did not consider
the possibility of state court jurisdiction. 17 ' The district court jurisdictional provisions
remained intact, 172 as did the function of the district courts as ultimate factlinders in the
Title VII enforcement scheme.' 73 That Congress extended the coverage of Title Vii
and yet retained the original provisions for federal court authority is evidence of Con-
gress's implicit intent that federal district courts continue to have exclusive jurisdiction
of Title VII claims.'"
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT OF TITLE VII TO AUTHORIZE STATE
COURT JURISDICTION
Although Title VII currently does not authorize state court jurisdiction, Congress
should amend Title VIP" to expressly authorize state court jurisdiction of Title VII
claims, at a minimum, in states that the EEOC has adjudged to have adequate fair
employment laws and enforcement proceedings. A number of considerations indicate
that state courts, as well as federal courts, should have jurisdiction of federal causes of
action. First, the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts may be appropriate where there
are parallel federal and state laws and claims and uniformity of interpretation therefore
is not a concern."6 Where there are comparable state laws, state courts are likely to have
the requisite subject matter expertise and inclination to enforce federal laws ade-
quately.'" Second, concurrent jurisdiction may be appropriate where the federal law is
likely to generate a sizable caseload that would benefit from allocation among federal
and state courts.' 78 Third, concurrent jurisdiction may better serve the convenience of
potential plaintiffs by affording a choice of forums and possibly expediting resolution
of claims.'"'
Changes in circumstances since the I972.amendment of Title VII indicate the need
for a change in the jurisdiction that Title VII currently authorizes. Since 1964, when
Congress enacted Title VII and only half of the states had their own fair employment
laws,'" most states have enacted fair employment laws which, similarly to Title VII,
LIL See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
1T2 § 706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
"3 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
174 Hence, the decisions in Bennun, 413 F. Supp. 1274 and Peterson, 20 FEY Cases 1322, were
improper. See supra notes 125-49 and accompanying text.
' 75 Congress justified Title VII as an exercise of its commerce clause power and could amend
Title VII on the same basis. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. U.S. CoNs•r. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 2 authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, 8, cl, 18 further
authorizes Congress to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" in regulating interstate
Commerce.
"6 Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Private Civil Actions, 70 HAIW. L. REV. 509,
515,517 (1957).
'" Id. Conversely, where uniformity of decisions is a concern, the federal bench is more likely
to have the requisite expertise to address federal law issues and to be sympathetic to a federal law,
particularly a controversial law. Congress then may prefer exclusive federal court jurisdiction. Id.
at 511-12; Redish & Muench, supra note 91, at 314-15.
178 Note, supra note 176, at 516.
"" Id. at 517.
Ls" See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, age, and national origin. 1 e'
Where the EEOC has determined that a state qualifies for deferral because the state has
and is enforcing a law comparable to Title VII,' 82
 concurrent jurisdiction of the state's
courts to hear Title VII claims would be appropriate. Because Title VII and the laws of
states qualifying for deferral serve similar purposes, state courts, in hearing state law
discrimination claims, are more likely to have the familiarity necessary to handle com-
parable Title VII claims competently.' 83
The authorization of state court jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims would be a
reasonable extension of the jurisdiction that state courts already exercise with regard to
other federal civil rights statutes such as sections 1981, 1 " 1982 , 185 1983 , n8 and
181
 See 8A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 451:101-451:107 (1984) for charts of state laws and id. at
451:201-451:206 for a list of state administrative agencies. State laws often have broader coverage
than Title VII because, for example, they prohibit more types of discrimination or apply to
employers with fewer than fifteen employees. Id. at 451:1. The laws of Alabama and Arkansas,
however, prohibit only age discrimination, and the laws of Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and
Virginia protect only state employees. Id. at 451:102-451:107.
State counterparts to the EEOC enforce most state laws. Id. at 451:201-451:206. State agencies
usually provide enforcement procedures similar to the Title VII enforcement procedure, comm-
encing with the employee's filing of a charge, continuing with informal conciliation and a hearing,
and concluding with a formal finding. Id. at 451:2. After the agency's finding, many state laws
permit interested parties to seek enforcement orders, injunctions or review in state court. Id.
182
 See supra note 34. Forty-six states have laws and administrative proceedings qualifying for
deferral under section 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1985). Alabama, Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi are the only states without agency proceedings qualifying for deferral.
Id. See supra note 181 regarding the shortcomings of the fair employment laws of Alabama, Arkansas,
and Mississippi.
18'
	 commentator, surveying changes in the states since the 1960's, suggests that the state
judiciary is just as well-suited as the federal judiciary to try Title VII cases and probably will not
decide them much differently. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 188 (1985).
Posner continues: "The time may have come to stop thinking in terms of stereotypes that, however
descriptive of the attitudes of Some state officials decades ago, ignore the peaceful but profound
social revolution that has occurred since the mid-1960's." /d.
184
 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1982)). Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C, § 1981 (1982).
184
	 of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1982)). Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
1811
 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings
for redress.
42 U.S.C.'§ 1983 (1982).
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1985 1 " of Title 42. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that state courts have
jurisdiction of actions under sections 1982' 88 and 1983. 1 " Moreover, lower federal courts
have recognized state court jurisdiction with regard to sections 1981 and 1985.' 9° Finally,
state courts have demonstrated a willingness to exercise jurisdiction of civil rights
claims. 191 Although the other civil rights statutes, unlike Title VII, are broadly phrasedm
and tack a comprehensive enforcement scheme,'" they share the remedial purpose of
Title VII. The similarity of purpose alone would not support the conclusion that state
courts currently have Title VII jurisdiction,' 94 but indicates that state courts are capable
of protecting civil rights and should be given the authority to remedy discrimination
complaints under Title VII.
Because the proliferation of state fair employment laws, as well as state court
enforcement of other federal civil rights statutes, indicates that state courts would ade-
quately enforce Title VII rights, concurrent jurisdiction would be appropriate to allocate
the Title VII caseload among federal and state courts. The 1972 amendment' 95 expanded
Title VII coverage to employment by state and local government,m to more private
employers,' 97 and to employment by the federal government.' 98 The amendment also
"7 Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284 (1861); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat.
13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982)). Section 1985(3) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws ... [and] do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (1982).
159 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969).
189 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7
(1979).
"9 See, e.g., DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 777 F.2d 440, 445 (9th Cir.
1985) (# 1981); Peterson, 20 FEP Cases at 1323 '(# 1981); Bennun, 413 F. Supp. at 1279 (# 1983,
# 1985).
1 " Vason, 31 Conn. Supp. at 338, 330 A.2d at 98 (## 1981-2000h-6); Royer v. Adams, 121 N.H.
1024, 1026-27, 437 A.2d 316, 317-18 (1981) (# 1983); Gray v. Serruto Builders, 110 N.J. Super.
297, 305, 265 A.2d 404, 408 (1970) (# 1982).
192 See supra notes 184-87.
193 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) confers original jurisdiction on the district courts and authorizes
their issuance of relief, including damages and equitable relief, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) permits
the courts to award attorney's fees. Otherwise, determination of the scope of the remedies provided
in sections 1981 through 1985 is left to the courts. C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMNER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL
STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.1, at 467 (1980) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION].
194 The federal court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which decided Valenzuela, recently
indicated that while federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII claims, the same is not
necessarily true with regard to claims under other federal civil rights statutes. In 1985, in DeHorney,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that claims under section 1981 are not analogous to Title Vii claims
and held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of section 1981 claims. DeHorney, 777 F.2d
at 445.
195 Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
196 Pub. L. 92-261, § 2(1),(2), 86 Stat. 108 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(a),(b)).
' 97 Pub. L. 92.261, 2(2), 86 Stat. 103 (1972); § 701(b) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
498 Pub. L. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111-13 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16).
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authorized the EEOC to sue employers in federal district court.'" An important moti-
vation for the amendment was the inability of the EEOC, limited to seeking employers'
voluntary compliance, to handle adequately the increasing number of charges being
filed.20O Of the thousands of charges filed, the EEOC had been able to remedy satisfac-
torily fewer than half. 201
 As a consequence, many employees, unless they had the re-
sources and time to pursue their claims in federal court, had to forgo their Title VII
claims and remedy, thus defeating the purpose of Title VII. 202
 Thus, by authorizing the
EEOC to initiate civil actions on behalf of employees, Congress increased the likelihood
of civil actions because the EEOC has the resources to bring suit where an individual
employee cannot. Therefore, the expansion of Title VII coverage was likely to increase
both the number of charges filed with the EEOC and the number of Title VII claims
pursued in federal court.20
 The authorization of state court jurisdiction would create
additional forums and possibly reduce delay in resolving a dispute, once the complaint
has passed through the cumbersome Title VII administrative proceedings. 2'm This po-
tential for expediting resolution of Title VII claims is a compelling reason for Congress
to extend jurisdiction to state courts. 205
Congress's provision for the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts also would elim-
inate problems that arise when Title VII defendants remove cases from state court to
federal district court. The ambiguity of the Title VII jurisdictional provision has led
some employees to bring their Title VII actions in state court, in the mistaken belief
that state courts have Title VII jurisdiction. 2°6
 Because the federal removal statute
permits unrestricted removal Of federal question cases to federal court, 207 defendants in
'99 Pub. L. 92-261, 4(a), 86 Stat. 105 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1)).
"(I See H.R. REP. No, 238, supra note 79, at 2139-40, 2144,
2(" See 1971 Hearings, supra note 80, at 53 (statement of William H. Brown, Ill, Chairman,
EEOC). From its inception in 1965 until the time of the hearings in 1971, the EEOC received
81,004 charges, with the number of charges filed increasing each year. Id.
Yin Id.
2°' The district courts may be more efficient than the EEOC in disposing of disputes because
the courts have the capacity to handle complex discrimination cases encompassing many employees
and claims. See id. at 125-29 (statement of David Norman, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, Department of Justice). The greater efficiency of the district courts, however, does not
preclude the possibility of burdensome Title VII litigation which could be better handled if state
courts had concurrent jurisdiction. The state court caseload, moreover, may not be as burdensome
as the federal court caseload. Recent statistics on the state court caseload indicate that state courts
have not suffered the much touted "litigation explosion" that has afflicted the federal courts. In
Search of the Litigation Explosion, NAT'L CTR. ST . CTS. REP., May 1986, at 2-3.
204
 EMPLOYMENT DiscittstiNATioN, supra note 193, 3.2, at 267-68.
2°3
 It should be noted that in Peterson, the EEOC, as amicus curiae, successfully contended that
state courts should have concurrent jurisdiction. Peterson, 20 FEP cases at 1323. That approach
contrasts with the EEOC's insistence, in hearings prior to the 1972 amendment, that granting the
EEOC adjudicative powers rather than authorizing the EEOC to file civil actions was a better way
to strengthen Title VII enforcement. See 1971 Hearings, supra note 80, at 54-55. The EEOC's
position in Peterson suggests that . the EEOC has found civil actions effective in enforcing Title VII
and seeks concurrent jurisdiction to allocate the caseload among federal and state courts and assure
that such enforcement continues.
2°6 See supra notes 100-23, 141-49 and accompanying text.
"2 The federal removal statute provides:
[Amity civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
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Title VII cases commenced in state court generally remove the cases to federal tourt.. 2"6
Jurisdiction of a federal court on removal, however, is derivative in nature.'" if the state
court where the case originated lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court to
which the action is removed also lacks jurisdiction. 21 "
Dismissal for lack of removal jurisdiction is technically sound but difficult for the
Title VII plaintiff to fathom where the dismissing court is the one with exclusive jiaris-
diction.2 " Further, the district court's dismissal may foreclose the employee from any
forum, federal or state, for his or her Title Vii claim where the ninety-day period for
filing a civil action has elapsed:212 The district court could apply the principle of equitable
tolling, so that the employee's timely filing in state court would be deemed to have tolled
the ninety-day period for filing in federal court. 213 Equitable tolling, however, is a wholly
discretionary remedy of limited scope 2" and may not be available to save the employee's
Title VII claim. 21 1 f, instead, Congress were to authorize the jurisdiction of state courts,
then not only would state courts have original jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims, but
federal district courts would have jurisdiction on removal. Concurrent state court juris--
diction would eliminate both the need for equitable tolling and the loss of Title VII
claims absent equitable tolling. 2 '"
Finally, by authorizing state courts to hear Title VII claims, Congress would provide
employees with an alternative forum that could hear Title VII and related state claims
to the district court of the United States of the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1082),
20" See supra notes 100-23, 141-49 and accompanying text.
20o
	 Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). See supra note
104.
211) See note 209. See also supra notes 100-23 and accompanying text.
211 In Dyer v. Greif Bros., the Ninth Circuit observed:
This is the kind of legal tour de force that most laymen cannot understand, particularly
in a case where the federal court not only has subject matter jurisdiction, but has
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. One would have thought that the purpose of
removal in such a case is to get the case out of the court that lacks jurisdiction to hear
it, and into the court that has jurisdiction, and to keep it in the latter court, so that it
can be tried and a valid [judgment] can be entered.
755 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir, 1985) (quoting State of Washington v. American League, 460 F.2d
654, 658-59 (9th Cir, 1972)).
212 See § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )(1).
21 ' See supra note 103 for a discussion of equitable tolling.
214
 See Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 436 11.2 and Dickinson, 456 F. Stipp. at 48, discussed supra notes
100-23 and accompanying text See also McCloud 25 FEP Cases at 515 (equitable tolling inappropriate
where plaintiff had no reasonable basis for believing state court had jurisdiction of Title VII claims);
cf. Fox, 615 F.2d at 720-21 (equitable tolling appropriate where plaintiff reasonably believed state
court had jurisdiction of Title VII claims).
212 Of course, even if the employee loses his or her Title VII claim, the employee still may seek
redress under state law because Title VII does not preempt other remedies. § 708, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e•7. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text, Moreover, the state remedy may prove
adequate and obviate the need fur the Title VII remedy. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 65-66. Nonetheless,
the purpose of Title VII — to compensate to the extent that a state law remedy is inadequate —
seems to require that the employee be able to assert a Title VII claim, whether or not the employee
recovers on the basis of that claiin.
" 6 The result in Peterson, 20 FEP Cases at 1323, although based on improper interpretation of
Title VII, illustrates the advantages of authorizing state court jurisdiction. See supra notes 141-49
and accompanying text.
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together. If an employee sues in federal district court, alleging discrimination in violation
of both Title VII and state law, the federal and state claims will be tried in one proceeding
only if the district court exercises pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. Pendent
jurisdiction is appropriate where there are federal claims and state claims sufficiently
related to each other that they comprise essentially one "case," 20 and consolidated trial
of all claims would serve judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants."
Nonetheless, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary. 2 ' 2
 If the state claims
are likely to predominate, by reason of the proof required or the remedy sought, the
federal court may dismiss the state law claims for resolution in state courts. 22° The
discrepancy between the limited, equitable relief available under Title VII and broader
remedies available under state law may persuade a district court to refuse pendent
jurisdiction. 221
Without state court jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims, a federal court's refusal of
pendent jurisdiction forces the employee to pursue the federal and state claims in two
forums or pursue only one remedy in one forum. Bifurcated resolution of the employee's
claims is burdensome to the employee. 222
 Moreover, where Title VII and state claims
generate similar issues, there is a risk that proceedings in one forum will preclude action
in the other, to the possible detriment of the employee. 2" Bifurcated litigation therefore
2'7
	 Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The Court in Gibbs stated that
"Whe federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court"
and "Rifle state and federal claims must derive From a common nucleus of operative fact." Id.
Federal and state claims must compose one "case," in accordance with U.S. CONST. art. III, f 2.
2 " Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
2'a
22"/d, at 726-27.
221 In Bouchet v. National Urban League, the appeals court upheld the district court's refusal
to exercise pendent jurisdiction. 730 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The plaintiff, alleging sex
discrimination and defamation in employment, sought a jury trial, equitable relief under Title VII,
and full compensatory and punitive damages under state law. Id. at 802-03. The district court
eventually dismissed the state law claims and, after a non jury trial, decided against the plaintiff on
the merits. Id. at 803. The appeals court first noted that the plaintiff's demand for a jury trial, if
successful, could compel trial by jury of the ordinarily non-jury Title VII claim. Id. The appeals
court said that there would be a conflict, however, only if the plaintiff was entitled to try the legal
and equitable claims in one federal action. Id. at 804. The appeals court observed that there was a
discrepancy between the limited equitable relief under Title VII and the broader relief available
for the state claims. Id. at 805. Consequently, the court continued, there was a risk that the pendent
state claims might predominate in the lawsuit and be pendent to the Title VII claims "much as a
dog is pendent to its tail," Id. at 805-06. The appeals court therefore concluded that the district
court's refusals of pendent jurisdiction and a jury trial were proper. Id. at 806. For similar outcomes,
see Jong-Yul Kim v. International Inst. of Metro. Detroit, 510 F. Supp. 722, 725-26 (E.D. Mich.
1981); Kiss v. Tamarac Utits., 463 F. Supp. 951, 954 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
222
 For a discussion of problems arising where a federal court refuses to exercise pendent
jurisdiction, see Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction Under Title
VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 AM. U.L. Rev. 777, 834-37 (1983).
2" Id. at 835. It is arguable that where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII
claims, then a state court's adjudication of a plaintiff's state law claims should not foreclose the
plaintiff's right to assert the Title VII claim in federal court, because the plaintiff could not have
asserted the Title VII claim in state court. Id. at 836. The Supreme Court, however, has indicated
that the prior state adjudication might bar the subsequent federal court adjudication, even if the
state court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 479 n.20, 485,
discussed infra note 231.
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is undesirable not only because it is inefficient and burdensome but also because the
doctrine of res judicata may apply to prevent the employee from fully pursuing a remedy
for employment discrimination.
One solution to the claims bifurcation problem would be increased federal court
exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Indeed, one commentator, specifically addressing Title
VII, has concluded that if federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII claims,
then there is implicit congressional intent that federal courts exercise pendent jurisdiction
over related state law claims. 224 A better solution, however, preferable because it would
not infringe on the discretion of federal courts with regard to pendent jurisdiction,
would be Congress's express authorization of state court jurisdiction under Title VII.
Congressional authorization of concurrent state court jurisdiction would, like pendent
jurisdiction, further judicial economy through consolidated trial of related federal and
state claims245 and reduce the risk that litigation of one claim will foreclose litigation of
the other.
Finally, although congressional authorization of state court jurisdiction under Title
VII is desirable, state court jurisdiction need not be identical to the Title VII jurisdiction
that federal courts enjoy. Congress may limit the newly recognized state court jurisdiction
in order to assure adequate state court enforcement of Title VII. One reasonable
restriction would be Congress's extension of jurisdiction only to state courts in states
with fair employment laws and administrative proceedings that qualify for EEOC defer-
ra1. 226 Where states have enacted fair employment laws comparable to Title VII, the
state courts will, by virtue of their familiarity with the issues arising under state law, be
more adept at handling Title VII litigation. 227 Congress also could refrain from extend-
494 See Catania, supra note 222, at 805-06. The author notes that a federal court's refusal of
pendent jurisdiction would force a plaintiff to litigate in two forums or abandon one and concludes
that "[ijt is unlikely that Congress would intend that such a result occur." Id. at 805.
22 .5 See Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 245, 250-51 (1980). The author, in asserting that judicial economy and convenience
to the parties could not have been the primary rationale for pendent jurisdiction in Gibbs, observes
that the same purposes would be served by "encouraging recourse to the state courts in those
instances in which jurisdiction over the claim is concurrent." Id, at 250.
State court jurisdiction of Title VII claims may not eliminate, however, the possibility of claim
bifurcation. It is conceivable that a state court, even if authorized to hear a Title VII claim, could
force bifurcation by refusing to hear it. The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that state
courts may not refuse enforcement of federal claims if they hear analogous state claims. Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). It is therefore reasonable to assume that a state court that enforces
a state law comparable to Title VII could not refuse to enforce Title VII.
Finally, it should be noted that congressional recognition of state court jurisdiction under Title
VII would be beneficial in one other respect. As a consequence of the Reorganization Plan No, 1
of 1978, see supra note 82, the EEOC acquired various administrative and enforcement powers of
the Department of Labor with regard to wages and hours under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1982). Unlike Title VII, the FLSA wage and hour enforcement
provisions expressly authorize the jurisdiction of state courts as well as federal courts. Id. § 216(b).
Also unlike Title VII, the FLSA permits a civil action without an intervening administrative pro-
ceeding. Id. Where Title VII and the FLSA overlap with regard to an employment discrimination
claim, the current inconsistencies in enforcement provisions may generate problems. Congressional
recognition of state court jurisdiction under Title VII would reduce the inconsistency.
226 See supra notes 34, 181-82.
227 See supra notes, 177, 180-83 and accompanying text.
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ing jurisdiction to state courts if it determined that state court jurisdiction would be
inappropriate for reasons other than state court competence. 223
 For example, exclusive
federal court jurisdiction might be preferable with regard to Title VII actions brought
by federal employees. 22° Absent such legislative restrictions, state courts would be subject
to few restraints in enforcing Title VII. 230
 Although the lack of restraint would not
necessarily undermine Title VII enforcement, Congress may prefer to qualify state court
jurisdiction of Title VII claims."'
CONCLUSION
The absence of express reference to state courts in the Title VII jurisdictional
provision has resulted in conflicting decisions regarding state court authority to hear
Title VII claims. The text and legislative history of Title VII, however, document
Congress's implicit intent to restrict jurisdiction of Title VII claims to federal district
courts. Nonetheless, while Title VII currently does not authorize state court jurisdiction,
changes in circumstances since Congress enacted Title VII in 1964 and amended Title
VII in 1972 indicate that exclusive federal court jurisdiction no longer is appropriate.
Given that most states have enacted and are enforcing Fair employment laws comparable
to Title VII, state courts as a group are more inclined and able than they were in 1964
or 1972 to provide the remedy for employment discrimination that Title VII authorizes.
Indeed, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have recognized the concurrent
jurisdiction of state courts to hear claims arising under other federal civil rights statutes.
For these reasons, Congress should amend Title VII to authorize state court jurisdiction
of Title VII claims, particularly in states that are enforcing 'adequate state fair employ-
ment laws.
JANET K. ADACHI
228 See Bennun, 413 F. Supp. at 1279-80 (possibility that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
of Attorney General actions against governmental employers). See supra note 138.
229 717,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. Title VII currently provides the sole judicial remedy for federal
employees alleging employment discrimination. See supra note 6.
220
	 court disposition of Title VII I
 cases would be subject to the remote authority of the
United States Supreme Court to review state court decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982), the prece-
dential effect of Supreme Court Title VII decisions which would obligate the state courts by reason
of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and the authority of Congress to alter state
court authority through amendment of Title VII.
2s1
	 extent to which state and local law may influence state courts in Title VII litigation is
beyond the scope of this note. The weight to be given prior state agency determinations, however,
appears to be one area where federal courts and state courts may have different standards. In
Kremer, the plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging a discriminatory discharge and exclusion
from rehiring. 456 U.S. at 463-64. The EEOC referred the charge to the state agency responsible
for enforcing the state fair employment law, and the employee pursued the claim unsuccessfully
through administrative proceedings and state court appeal. Id. at 464. Upon receipt of a right-to-
sue letter, the employee then sought relief in federal district court under Title VII. Id. at 465. The
district court eventually dismissed on res judicata grounds, and the appeals court affirmed. Id. at
465-66. The Supreme Court concluded that through the state administrative and judicial proceed-
ings, the employee had enjoyed a full and fair adjudication of the discrimination claim. Id. at 483-
84. Thus, the Court held that the state court's prior review and decision precluded the employee
from asserting the Title VII claim in district court. Id. at 485. The Court noted, however, that an
unreviewed state agency determination would not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, even
if the agency decision would preclude de novo consideration in state court. Id. at 470 n.7.
